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This paper describes tax reforms in OECD countries over the last 20 years and how they 
are related to tax competition. Both individual countries’ reforms and multilateral 
initiatives and developments are covered. This is followed by an overview of the 
empirical evidence on tax competition.  
The paper begins by describing stylised fact about the evolution of taxes over the past 
few decades following Devereux et al. (2002): statutory tax rates have fallen; tax bases 
were broadened, particularly during the eighties; effective tax rates, which capture the 
impact of the tax rate and base on the return from an investment, fell for profitable 
projects, but remained fairly stable for projects that just break even or make low profits; 
tax revenues from corporate income have remained broadly stable as a proportion of 
GDP since 1965; tax revenues from corporate income have declined as a proportion of 
total tax revenue since 1965, but have remained relatively stable since 1980. 
These complex patterns cannot be explained by most of the basic tax competition models. 
More advanced models, which for example allow firms to earn positive rents, can provide 
explanations. Because several alternative models yield very similar empirical predictions, 
it is however empirically difficult to test which one is driving the developments. The 
multilateral initiatives that were implemented however do not seem to be related to any 
model of resource-based tax competition. Instead they appear to be about the 
enforcement of taxing rights, even when claiming otherwise. 
A broad reading of the empirical literature on the interdependence of tax-setting 
authorities suggests that some such interdependence does exist, particularly between local 
and national governments. Data limitations however raise some questions about the 
robustness of these findings. We conclude that there is likely to be some interdependence 
even if the exact process remains unclear.  3
1. Introduction 
Globalisation and increased capital mobility are a much-discussed topic. Despite some 
dissenting views, most observers agree that the interdependence between countries and 
the importance of the economic links between them has reached an extent unprecedented 
in history.  
One of the fears often expressed in the context of globalisation is that the mobility of 
multinationals may put pressure on governments to reduce corporate income taxes in 
order to remain attractive for the location of capital. The most pessimistic view is that this 
will lead to a “race to the bottom” with extremely low, possible zero corporate income 
taxes. But are these scenarios realistic?  
Economic theory has much progressed from the first models of tax competition (Zodrow 
and Mieszkowski 1986, Wilson 1986) on which this stark prediction rests. There is now a 
wide body of literature offering diverging predictions, depending on the type of tax 
competition studied and the assumptions made.
1 While the view that capital mobility puts 
downward pressure on corporate income taxes is more widely held than the opposite 
view, there is little consensus on whether this is beneficial, harmful or irrelevant to 
economic welfare.  
It is thus important to study the empirical evidence. Casual observation seems to support 
the hypothesis that countries compete, as statutory tax rates have fallen in most 
industrialised countries over the past few decades. Occasionally these tax cuts were 
accompanied by statements specifying that they had been in response to competitive 
pressures.
2 Many tax reforms, however, have been more complex than simple reductions 
                                                 
1 See Wilson (1999) for a survey. 
2 E.g. in its Budget 2000, the Canadian government stated that “In recent years, many industrialized 
countries have either reduced their corporate tax rates or announced their intention to lower them. If no 
action were taken, Canada’s general corporate tax rate would not be competitive with those of our trading 
partners. The Government’s objective is to reduce, within five years, the federal corporate income tax rate 
to 21 per cent from 28 per cent” (Department of Finance Canada, 2000). In the UK, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer stated in his 1997 budget speech, “I want the United Kingdom to be the obvious first choice for 
new investment. So I have decided to cut the main rate of corporation tax by 2 per cent from 33 per cent to  4
of the tax rate. In this paper we discuss tax reforms in OECD countries in more detail. 
We confirm the observation that most countries have lowered tax rates on corporate 
income and broadened tax bases. Interestingly tax revenues from corporate income have 
remained fairly stable, both relative to GDP and total tax revenue during the reforms.  
Apart from changing their own tax system, countries may respond to competitive 
pressures multilaterally. There have been several such initiatives. While some of the 
initiatives have been implemented, none of the more ambitious ones aiming to restrict the 
sovereignty of setting tax rates were successful.  
It is useful to begin by clarifying the meaning of a few terms. By “capital mobility” we 
mean that productive activity can be shifted at low cost across countries. It is important to 
note that capital need not actually move, the possibility that it can is sufficient. This 
means that it can be difficult to find evidence for capital mobility. One indirect way is to 
compare rates of return across countries, the idea being that corporate mobility will 
equalise these. However, rates of return may differ because of many factors which it can 
be difficult to control for, e.g. country-specific risks or a home-bias to investment. While 
there is some evidence in the other direction
3 on balance it seems that the mobility of 
capital must have increased, due to the abolition of capital controls in most countries, the 
increasing number of free trade agreements
4 and the foundation of the World Trade 
Organization. 
“Tax competition” can refer to many different processes. We use it to describe the 
phenomenon that countries lower their corporate income taxes in order to attract the real 
activities of firms. There is also competition for taxing rights, i.e. competition for having 
profits reported in a particular country, without any associated movement of production. 
                                                                                                                                               
31 per cent, the lowest ever rate in the UK. This means that we will have the lowest corporation tax rate of 
any of our major competitors” HM Treasury (1997). 
3 See inter alia Feldstein and Horioka (1980), Dooley et al. (1987) and Bayoumi (1990). 
4 Free trade agreements only have an indirect effect on the mobility of capital, by making it possible to 
produce abroad and continue selling in the home market. Note that the capital flow between countries could 
also decrease, because it will be less often necessary to locate abroad just to avoid tariffs. This does not 
however constitute a reduction in capital mobility as the term is most often used by economists and in this 
paper, because the cost of moving capital has not increased.  5
Whenever we refer to the latter in this paper, we will clarify this by using the term 
competition for “paper profits” or “taxing rights”. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the following section we summarise the 
development of corporate income taxes in OECD countries over the last 20 years. This 
includes a discussion about whether reforms may have been driven by tax competition, 
and how tax revenues have evolved. In section 3 we discuss multilateral policy initiatives 
and their success so far. In section 4 we provide a summary of the empirical evidence of 
tax competition. Section 5 briefly concludes. 
2.  Tax reforms and levels of taxation in OECD countries 
The theoretical literature on tax competition generally distinguishes between mobile and 
immobile factors. In order to study how tax reforms compare to the theoretical 
predictions we need to distinguish between taxes on mobile and immobile factors. This is 
not easy. We start with the assumption that capital is generally more mobile than labour. 
This is generally true, although there are some exceptions, e.g. for some types of highly 
skilled labour. It leads however to the question: what are taxes on capital?  
One approach, developed by Mendoza et al. (1994) and widely applied (e.g. Eurostat 
1999), is to consider all taxes that are not formally levied on consumption or labour 
income to be taxes on capital. This is likely to be too broad a category though. It includes 
for example taxes on land, an immobile factor. We focus on corporate income taxes. This 
may also include some taxes on immobile activity - not all types of business have the 
option of operating internationally. However, an increasingly large share of activity is 
mobile, including even the provision of some services as evidenced, e.g. by the increase 
in the use of call centres located abroad. While multinationals pay many taxes other than 
corporate income taxes, these are likely to be the most important ones at the margin. Note 
also that while corporate taxes are levied on mobile capital, they are not necessarily 
incident on the owners of capital (i.e. they may not bear the effective burden of the tax). 
In fact, in the extreme case of perfectly mobile capital and perfectly immobile labour, the 
incidence of all taxes will fall on the immobile factor.  6
2.1.  Corporate income tax reforms 
Numerous corporate income tax reforms were undertaken in OECD countries over the 
past two decades. Out of the 19 countries for which we have data all, except for Spain, 
now have a lower tax rate than in 1982.
5 Most of these countries have not only changed 
their tax rate, but also other aspects of their corporate income tax systems. We can 
distinguish two types of reforms. First, there were a few structural reforms, which did not 
just change the parameters of the tax system, but instead affected the principle approach 
taken to corporate income taxation. Such reforms include the abolition of a split rate 
system in Germany and Japan and the introduction of allowances for corporate equity in 
Austria and Italy.
6 These reforms are not analysed here. More frequent, however, were 
reforms that adjusted parameters of existing tax systems rather than the system itself. 
These include changes to the statutory tax rate or the rates of investment allowances. 
These reforms can be compared across countries. We do that by focussing on the key 
parameters of the tax system and documenting their behaviour over time. 
2.2.  Common characteristics of reforms 
Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002) analysed the development of taxes on corporate 
income in EU and G7 countries over the last two decades. They find the following 
stylised facts: 
•  Statutory tax rates fell. 
•  Tax bases were broadened, particularly during the eighties. 
•  Effective tax rates, which capture the impact of the tax rate and base on the return 
from an investment, fell for profitable projects, but remained fairly stable for 
projects that just break even or make low profits. 
                                                 
5 Although in some countries tax rates have been increased for some sectors. Ireland for example increased 
its manufacturing rate from 10% to 12.5% in 2003. For all other sectors of the economy the tax rate was 
however cut gradually (4 percentage points per year) from 36% in 1997 to 12.5% in 2003, so that in total 
this reform can be described as achieving a tax cut.  7
•  Tax revenues from corporate income have remained broadly stable as a 
proportion of GDP since 1965. 
•  Tax revenues from corporate income have declined as a proportion of total tax 
revenue since 1965, but have remained relatively stable since 1980. 
The statutory tax rate on corporate income fell in all but one country (Spain) over the 
period 1982 and 2003, as shown in Figure 1. Ireland increased its manufacturing rate, but 
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Figure 1: Statutory tax rates in OECD countries.
 7 
 
                                                                                                                                               
6 A number of countries have reformed the interaction between the corporate and personal income tax 
systems. Generally this was a move away from imputation and towards shareholder relief systems. An 
analysis of this is however beyond the scope of this paper. 
7 Statutory tax rates include surtaxes and local tax rates (or an average thereof). In the case of multiple tax 
rates, the manufacturing rate was chosen.  8
To illustrate the fall in statutory tax rates further, Figure 2 shows the average statutory tax 
rate for most OECD countries,
8 the interval obtained by adding and subtracting one 
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Figure 2: OECD average statutory tax rates
10 
There is a steeper fall in the simple average than in the weighted one, suggesting that 
small countries have cut their tax rates more than the large economies. Figure 2 shows the 
development for the five largest economies: 
                                                 
8 We have data on the following 19 OECD countries (out of 24 member countries in 1982): Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. 
9 The definition of the tax rate is less straightforward than one might think. In many countries it can be 
complicated to calculate a typical tax rate, because there may be regional variation in tax rates, 
supplementary taxes or tax credits and industry-specific rates. Our approach is to include local taxes and 
any other surtaxes on corporate profits. See Chennells and Griffith (1997) for details.  
10 Statutory tax rates include surtaxes and local tax rates (or an average thereof). In the case of multiple tax 

























Figure 3: Statutory tax rates of the G5 economies 
To illustrate the broadening of tax bases, we define a measure of the value of capital 
allowances for investment in plant and machinery, which is the largest component of 
investment for most firms. This measure will range from 0%, where there are no capital 
allowances, to 100%, where the entire cost is allowed to be written down
11 for tax 
purposes in the year of purchase.
12 This measure is strongly related to the tax base. The 
higher the value of allowances, the smaller the tax base. While other factors will also 
affect the size of the tax base, such as rules about the calculation of inventories, the 
deductibility of business expenses etc., the value of investment allowances is likely to be 
the single most important factor for its determination.  
                                                 
11 We use the term “written down” rather than “depreciated”, to distinguish between the tax treatment of the 
asset and the accounting treatment. In many countries the deprecation rates used by accountants in the 
preparation of the published accounts can differ substantially from the rate at which assets can be written 
down for tax purposes, although other countries require both to be the same. 
12 This value can exceed 100% if allowances are worth more than the asset. This can occur e.g. with 
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Figure 4: OECD average value of investment allowances for plant & machinery
13 
Figure 4 shows the fall in tax allowances. Most of this occurred in the late eighties. The 
dispersion of allowance rates across countries also decreased substantially. 
Figure 5 again shows measures for the five largest economies. The reduction was 
particularly strong in the UK where allowances were cut from 100% to 25%. Most 
countries reduced allowances by less than that, Japan left them unchanged and Germany 
reduced them only very recently. 
                                                 
13 The value of allowances assumes an inflation rate of 3.5%, a real discount rate of 10% and economic 

































Figure 5: The value of capital allowances in G5 countries.
14 
In theory it is ambiguous whether the net effect of a tax rate cut combined with base-
broadening will reduce or increase average tax rates faced by firms. This will depend on a 
number of firm-specific characteristics. First, because investment allowances depend on 
the assets invested in, firms will be affected differently depending on their asset structure. 
Second, because of interest deductibility and dividend taxation, this will depend on the 
sources of finance a firm uses. Third, because of the non-linearity of the tax system, it 
will depend on how profitable a firm is.  A firm whose profitability is low will mainly 
benefit from generous allowances, because the value of allowances will correspond to a 
large share of their profit. A highly profitable firm, earning not only normal economic 
profits, but also rents, will benefit more from low tax rates. The allowances, which are 
fixed, will make up a smaller share of their profits, but the low tax rate will be applied to 
                                                 
14 The value of allowances assumes an inflation rate of 3.5%, a real discount rate of 10% and economic 
depreciation rates for plant and machinery of 12.25%.  12
their total profits. Effective tax rates measure the net effect taking different parameters of 
the tax system and firm-specific characteristics into account.  
Effective tax rates are forward looking measures that are based on the tax laws. As tax 
laws can differ across industries and can depend on assets invested in and sources of 
finance used, and because non-linear tax systems imply that tax rates vary with profit 
rates, there are in theory infinitely many effective tax rates.
15 We present two typical 
examples of effective tax rates, one for a project that just breaks even (known as the 
effective marginal tax rate, or EMTR) and one for a project with a positive rate of 
economic profits of 20% (an example of an effective average tax rate or EATR). Both 
assume that the project is equity financed and that the investments is in plant and 
machinery. We keep the inflation rate fixed in order to focus on changes in the tax law. 
For a discussion of the impact of relaxing these assumptions see inter alia Devereux, 
Griffith and Klemm (2002) or for the UK, Devereux and Klemm (2004). 
                                                 
15 Other factors affecting effective tax rates are whether firms are tax exhausted, whether firms are 
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Figure 6: Average effective tax rates
16 
As shown in Figure 6, effective tax rates have fallen, suggesting that the net effect of 
base-broadening and rate-cutting was to lower taxes. Effective tax rates have fallen much 
more for highly profitable projects.
17 
2.3.  The link to theory 
Can the stylised facts described above be explained by tax competition theory? The 
generally predicted fall in tax rates certainly seems in line with most models that predict a 
downward trend in taxes on mobile factors of production. However, tax models generally 
                                                 
16 This figure assumes an investment in plant and machinery financed from equity (i.e. retained earnings or 
new equity). Shareholder level taxes are not included. Assumed inflation rate of 3.5%, real discount rate of 
10% and economic depreciation of 12.25%. For the EATR the assumed economic profit rate is 20% 
(implying a nominal profit of 30%). The average is weighted by GDP in US$. 
17 Varying most of the assumptions does not affect these findings. However, for purely debt-financed 
projects, the effective marginal tax rate has risen.   14
do not distinguish between different aspects of tax systems, such as bases and rates, but 
assume that a single rate applies to all capital assets. 
One of the few papers that does differentiate between bases and rates is Haufler and 
Schjelderup (2000). They argue that countries with relatively high tax rates will want to 
reduce allowances to mitigate the effect on income shifting. An exogenous reduction in 
the cost of income shifting would have a similar effect as a high tax rate: it would make 
income shifting more attractive and hence lead to base broadening. This is consistent with 
the findings described above.  
Devereux et al. (2002) argue that another possible explanation for the observed trends is 
that countries might be particularly interested in attracting highly profitable investment 
such as those performed by multinationals. In order to attract such firms, governments 
will have to reduce statutory tax rates. In order to limit the revenue cost, they might then 
reduce allowances. As these are less relevant for highly profitable investments, they are 
less likely to drive away FDI of multinationals.  
So, while most economic models do not distinguish between tax bases and rates, there are 
still two alternative explanations for the observed behaviour. Which of them is more 
important remains unclear. 
2.4. Revenue  effects 
Having discussed tax reforms and their possible motivations, we now address the 
question of what effect these reforms have had on corporate income tax revenues. The 
general reduction in tax rates might lead one to guess that the reforms should have led to 
lower tax revenues. However, many reasons why this may not be the case include the 
changes in the tax base, changes in economic activity, such as the rate of incorporation, 
the growth and profitability in the incorporated sector of the economy, and the 
distribution of types of investment. Whether or not tax revenues increased is thus an 
empirical question. 
It should be noted that revenue figures need to be interpreted with care. Not only are they 
affected by many non-tax factors, as mentioned above. They are also backward looking 
measures, as tax revenues are affected by past legislation and events. An example of the  15
former are grandfathering clauses. An example of the latter are losses brought forward. 
These have the effect of increasing tax revenues in the year losses are made (compared to 
the case of a symmetric tax system), and decreasing tax revenues in the following years, 
while they are being used up. Therefore data for a single year are not very informative 
about the level of taxes in a country. It is however possible to learn something from 
revenue figures when observing trends over the longer term. 
In this paper we will consider two simple measures of corporate tax revenues: 
corporation tax revenues as a share of GDP and total tax revenues. The main other 
measure used in the literature is an implicit tax rate on capital as developed by Mendoza 
et al. (1994). As stated above, one problem of that measure is that the category “capital” 
is too broad for our purposes here. An equivalent implicit tax rate for the corporate sector 
has been suggested (Devereux and Klemm, 2004), but requires data that are difficult to 
obtain for a large group of countries. We thus restrict ourselves here to the simple ratios, 
bearing in mind that they will depend on the size of the corporate sector in the 
economy.
18  
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Figure 7: Corporate income tax revenues as a proportion of GDP
19 
Figure 7 shows corporate income tax revenues as a fraction of GDP. They have remained 
remarkably stable during this period of tax rate cuts. The weighted average moves with 
the economic cycle, but there is no discernible downward trend. The unweighted average 
even increases over the period, suggesting that small economies have managed to 
increase their revenues relative to larger economies. 
If we looked at data for a single country, one explanation for stable revenues despite 
lower tax rates could be that the low tax rate has attracted either real activity or reported 
profits and thus boosted tax revenues. The averages in Figure 7 however are based on 
data for the OECD as whole. In that case this explanation is most unlikely to hold, as this 
group of countries broadly makes up the whole industrialised world, and is unlikely to 
have attracted much capital or reported profits from developing countries. Some shifting 
towards smaller low tax countries might however explain why the unweighted average 
increases compared to the weighted one. Overall the explanation for that pattern must 
                                                 
19 Data from OECD Revenue Statistics, 2003 (tax class 1200). Weights based on GDP in US$.  17
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Figure 8: Corporate income tax revenues as a proportion total tax revenues
20 
Figure 8 shows corporate income tax revenues as a share of total taxation. Again, we see 
no marked downward trend, although it could be argued that the weighted average has 
fallen slightly, at least since the late eighties. While the current level is not below historic 
lows, the series has not remained at this low level for long. So arguably, while 
governments have managed to keep corporate income tax revenues pretty constant as a 
share of GDP, they have not managed to increase these revenues as much as other taxes.  
It might be the case that there is not much movement, because 20 years is not a long 
enough time horizon. Figure 9 therefore extends the time period considered backwards to 
1965. The figure also includes other important classes of taxes, along with the share 
corporate income taxes make up. 
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Figure 9: Major sources of government revenue as a share of total taxation
21 
Figure 9 shows that since 1965 the share of tax revenues from personal income taxes has 
increased, while all other taxes declines as a share of total revenue. By the eighties this 
process seems to have been completed, with only minor subsequent changes to the 
pattern of tax sources. 
This could be seen as support for the tax competition predictions, it is puzzling why most 
of the changes occurred between 1965 and 1980, while capital mobility continued to 
increase. The European Single Market for example only came fully into effect in 1993. 
Possibly the early changes, such as the abolition of exchange controls were much more 
important that the subsequent small steps that merely aimed to improve capital mobility 
even further. 
                                                 
21 Data from OECD Revenue Statistics, 2003. The taxes shown correspond to the following tax classes (in 
parentheses): Personal income taxes (sum of taxes on income of individuals (1100) and social security 
contributions (2000)), corporate income (1200), goods and service taxes (5000), property taxes (4000). 
Weights based on GDP in US$.  19
3. Multilateral  initiatives 
Having looked at tax reforms generally, this section focuses on multilateral initiatives and 
international developments that affect the interdependencies of international tax systems. 
The main multilateral initiatives were undertaken by the OECD and the European 
Commission. In the EU, individual countries are not only affected by new initiatives and 
evolving laws, but also by the interpretation of existing EU law by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ). We will address to what extent European law may restrict individual 
countries’ choices for tax reform, and how in many cases it forces them to change their 
existing national laws.  
3.1. OECD  initiatives 
The major multilateral initiative outside the EU was initiated by the OECD. In principle 
OECD initiatives have the potential advantage that they cover a greater range of countries 
including virtually all industrialised ones. Any measure at the European level will always 
suffer from the flaw that the important economies of North-America and Japan are not 
included. However, because the OECD Council can only decide unanimously, it is 
unlikely that any initiative necessitating a major change in any member country’s tax 
system would be adopted.  
The OECD has undertaken an initiative against “harmful” tax competition. In the OECD 
context, harmful tax competition includes practices in member countries, but also those 
of “tax havens”. For the first purpose, a harmful tax practice is defined as one with no, or 
nominal, effective tax rates and with a lack of effective exchange of information, lack of 
transparency, or ring-fencing. For tax havens, the definition is the same, except that the 
last criterion, ring-fencing, is replaced by lack of substantial activity taking place in the 
country. Note that simply having a tax rate of zero is not sufficient, if this is applied 
transparently and indiscriminately.  20
The first result of the OECD work was the publication of a report on harmful tax 
competition in 1998 (OECD, 1998). Based on that report the Council of the OECD
22 
recommended that member countries implement the recommendations included in the 
report, mainly to remove the listed harmful regimes by mid-2003. The Council further 
instructed the Committee on Fiscal Affairs to establish a Forum on Harmful Tax 
Practices. This forum has since reported twice on the progress made (OECD 2000, 
2001b). It also maintains a list of uncooperative tax havens. This was initially made up of 
34 jurisdictions, but many of them agreed to co-operate and some were re-evaluated, so 
the list has dwindled down to only six
23 remaining tax havens.  
One of the issues that remains unclear about this initiative is the question of what the 
consequences of non-compliance will be. So far the Forum has been rather silent on 
progress on member states’ harmful regimes, which should have been abandoned by now. 
In the case of tax havens, the 1998 report recommends not renewing tax treaties with 
them, but whether this is a strong threat is unclear. In the 2001 update, it was promised 
that any co-ordinated defensive measure would not be applied to tax havens any earlier 
than to member states. It thus remains a question of what form such measure might take 
and when they might be applied. 
In conclusion, the OECD initiative seems to be mainly about the prevention of revenue 
erosion to tax havens or into special regimes within member countries. It has less to do 
with tax competition as usually thought of by economists, as there are not plans to limit 
the general design of tax systems, as long as they are transparent and exchange of 
information is in place. 
3.2. EU  initiatives 
The initiatives at the European level cannot be understood without first considering some 
of the institutional background of the European Union. EU treaties to date have not 
                                                 
22 Switzerland and Luxembourg abstained (but did not use their veto), which implies that the Council 
decision is not binding on them. Belgium and Portugal abstained from the 2001 progress report. 
23 Andorra, Liechtenstein, Liberia, Monaco, the Marshall Islands and Nauru. 
  21
covered direct taxation, which is left to individual member states. Member states are 
however restricted by the provisions of the treaties that created the single market and the 
economic community. The main issues of relevance are that the free movement of capital 
must not be compromised and that firms or nationals from other member states must not 
be discriminated against. Direct taxation remains one of the areas not covered by majority 
voting, so that any directives or regulations can only be passed if there is unanimity. 
While an extreme interpretation of the treaty provisions would lead to the conclusion that 
it is impossible to keep separate tax systems,
24 the general view is that tax systems can be 
kept different, as long as there are provisions to avoid double-taxation, and as long as 
firms are taxed the same in the source country. Tax harmonisation is therefore not an 
automatic process that will follow from the enforcement of current EU law. Instead it 
requires new legislation or voluntary agreements. 
Some insights into how priorities and aims have changed over time can be gained by 
looking at the history of initiatives.
25 The first time much attention was paid to this issue 
was in the Neumark report of 1962, which concluded that tax bases should be harmonised 
in order to simplify the system. The European Commission published two memoranda in 
1967 and 1969, the first of which made again the case for base harmonisation, while the 
second argued in favour of rate harmonisation. In 1975 the Commission attempted an 
“Action Programme” of numerous initiatives aimed at corporate taxation (1975), double-
taxation (1976) and dividend taxation (1978). However, despite these numerous attempts, 
no initiative was successful other than in raising awareness for these issues. From 1990 
onwards there was a change of strategy and the Commission started less ambitious but 
more focussed initiatives. This led to successful introduction of three measures
26 to avoid 
double-taxation. Thereafter an independent review under the chairmanship of Onno 
Ruding was commissioned, the result of which was a suggestion to harmonise tax rates to 
a very limited degree by introducing a minimum rate of 30% (European Commission, 
                                                 
24 This is because any difference in tax rates will be a barrier to investing in a country with higher tax rates, 
as firms would prefer to simply export to that country. 
25 A more detailed account of the initiatives is given in Chetcuti (2001). 
26 The Merger Directive, Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Arbitration Convention.  22
1992). Interestingly, this suggestion, which seemed very modest at that time, as only 
Ireland had a lower rate, would now be rather hard to implement. Currently there are four 
countries below that level (Finland, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden) and a further three 
exactly at the level (Denmark, Luxembourg and the UK), which shows how fast tax 
systems are evolving. 
Because of the difficulty of implementing changes in an area where unanimity is 
required, a new approach was taken in 1997. This new approach was to use voluntary 
measures rather than legislation. The first, and so far only such measure, was the 
adoption of a code of conduct on business taxation. This code was adopted by the 
Council in 1997 (Council of the EU, 1998) and is aimed against “harmful” tax 
competition. “Harmful” is taken to mean preferential tax treatment to a subgroup of 
firms. It is very similar to the part of the OECD initiative that concerns member states. 
The process was first to stop introducing new measures (“stand-still”) and then to abolish 
existing ones (“roll-back”). This was achieved by a committee, which examined 
potentially harmful tax regimes. Interestingly, most of the ones considered harmful, had 
little to do with allocation of capital, and were instead more about taxing rights.
27 The 
final date for roll-back was 2003, but for some measures this was subsequently extended 
to 2010. However, it is not clear how this can be enforced, as the code does not provide 
for sanctions.  
The latest initiative was a report (European Commission 2001a) and a communication 
(European Commission 2001b) by the Commission in 2001. The proposal was once again 
base harmonisation, however this time with the aim of introducing formula 
apportionment to deal with the increasing difficulties caused by transfer pricing. Even 
though some observers may interpret these proposals as a step towards future 
harmonisation of tax rates, there is no direct connection between the introduction of 
formula apportionment and rate harmonisation. In any event, it is doubtful to what extent, 
if at all, the 2001 proposals will be implemented. 
                                                 
27 E.g. tax advantages for the shipping industry were considered acceptable, because necessary in an 
internationally competitive environment. Many regimes in financial services were considered harmful, e.g. 
Belgian co-ordination centres, even though these hardly affect the allocation of real capital.  23
In conclusion, while the European Commission has been very active in this area, 
relatively little has been achieved so far. This is unlikely to change in the future, unless 
majority voting were to be introduced for direct tax matters. 
3.3.  The role of the ECJ 
In recent years companies have taken governments to court claiming that national tax 
laws were breaching European law, particularly the European Community Treaty (EC 
Treaty)
28 and its non-discrimination provisions. This development is different from the 
initiatives described above, as it is not driven by policy. Instead it results from the 
increased willingness to take governments to court and from the court’s interpretation of 
the EC Treaty.  
Most national tax systems are discriminatory with respect to transactions with foreign 
countries. This is not surprising, as much more tax is generally at stake than in the case of 
purely domestic transactions. To limit the possibility that multinationals report profits 
where taxes are lowest, most countries use a range of legislative measures. These include 
transfer pricing legislation, which prescribes the use of arm’s length prices for 
international transactions between related parties. Other examples are thin capitalisation 
rules (disallowance of excessive debt) and controlled foreign corporation (CFC) regimes. 
Many countries also limit certain benefits to domestic taxpayers, particularly when they 
are aimed at achieving a domestic policy goal. Examples include tax credits, e.g. for 
R&D, reduced tax rates for small companies and relief for losses of domestic companies 
of a group. 
A strict interpretation of the EC Treaty would imply that most of these rules are contrary 
to European law and must be repealed or amended. There are clearly two ways to achieve 
conformance with European law. Either beneficial rules can be extended to apply to all 
EU firms or they can be repealed even for domestic ones. Both of these options come at a 
cost though.  
                                                 
28 Also known as Treaty of Rome. This treaty came into force in 1958 and was subsequently amended a 
number of times. It is now constitutes one of the three pillars of the European Union Treaty.  24
A recent consultation on corporate tax reform in the UK (HM Treasury/Inland Revenue, 
2003) has shown that the UK’s policy seems to be to reduce domestic benefits rather than 
extending them to cover transaction within the EU. Specifically, this consultation 
proposes to extend transfer price regulation to domestic transactions. While this would 
make the system non-discriminative, it is a proposal which otherwise has no benefit. It 
will increase compliance and administrative costs, but have very limited effects on tax 
revenues. Non-discrimination would thus be achieved by increasing the costs of domestic 
transaction.
29  
Gammie (2003) lists four main areas in which current and future ECJ judgements are 
likely to influence national tax policy. First, dividend taxation is likely to move away 
from imputation systems, because such systems lead to a preference for investment in 
home country shares and for a preferential treatment of domestic shareholders. This could 
be avoided by paying tax credits across borders and providing relief for dividends 
received from abroad, but these options are very costly. In fact a number of member 
states, including Germany and the UK, have already dismantled their imputation systems. 
Second, residence-based taxation is likely to become increasingly difficult, as the concept 
of residence of pan-European firms will be less and less meaningful. Some schemes to 
ensure residence-based taxation, such as CFC legislation, are by nature discriminatory 
and therefore likely to be ruled out. Third, and related to the previous point, exemption 
systems are likely to replace credits systems. While these are not prohibited as such, it 
might be difficult to run them in a way that is at the same time administratively practical, 
competitive and EU-law compliant. Fourth, transfer pricing legislation is less likely to be 
enforceable, although the recent consultation in the UK (see above) suggests that member 
states are willing to accept high administrative and compliance costs in order to be able to 
keep such legislation.  
The previous discussion suggests that ECJ judgements may lead to fundamental changes 
of national tax systems. The ECJ however only plays a negative role, in that it can only 
rule against national provisions. The effect this has on tax competition is unclear. To the 
                                                 
29 A further discussion of this and a list of other UK tax legislation that may be in breach of the EC Treaty 
are contained in Bond and Klemm (2003).  25
extent that national measures aimed at preventing such competition are ruled out, this 
process could lead to more competition. A co-ordinated response by member states 
would be possible, but this cannot be achieved by the ECJ, which merely ensures that the 
EC Treaty provisions are heeded. 
4.  Empirical evidence on competition 
Having discussed tax reforms and multilateral initiatives, we now summarise the growing 
empirical literature on tax competition. Two main approaches are taken in the literature. 
Some papers study the issue indirectly, e.g. by looking for the responsiveness of 
investment to tax rates. Other studies use direct empirical evidence. This can be done at 
the sub-national level, e.g. between federal states, or across countries. While cross-
country studies are more relevant for the purposes of this paper, it is also useful to look at 
within-country evidence, because there has been much more work using such data. 
Furthermore such studies have the advantage that many data comparability problems or 
problems of unobservable heterogeneity can be assumed away. 
4.1.  Indirect Studies  
The main approach of indirect studies is to estimate the sensitivity of firms to changes in 
tax regimes. This allows conclusions to be drawn about tax competition: if there is 
evidence that such sensitivity is strong, then this would suggest that rational welfare-
maximising governments would either engage in tax competition, or set taxes co-
operatively. There are several recent surveys of this sort of indirect evidence. Hines 
(1999) reviews this literature and concludes that the allocation of real resources is highly 
sensitive to tax policies. De Mooij and Ederveen (2001) similarly conclude that foreign 
capital is very sensitive to tax using meta analysis. Devereux and Griffith (2002) discuss 
these findings and the literature on which they are based. They conclude that, while there 
is some evidence that taxes affect firms’ location and investment decisions, it is not clear 
how big this effect is. They also note that the literature has provided little by way of 
insight into the key questions for policy interest. Linking the (reduced form) estimates  26
from this literature to the (structural) parameters in a model of tax competition is very 
difficult, and has not been done satisfactorily. Thus, while we can conclude that tax 
policy is important, we are unable to say very much from these indirect studies on any 
more specific policy questions. Neither can these findings prove that there is a process of 
tax competition. All they show is that a pre-condition for such a process is fulfilled. 
4.2. Direct  Studies 
(a) Preliminary  methodological  remarks 
Direct evidence can be obtained by estimating the interdependence in tax rates between 
jurisdictions.
30 This is usually done by estimating whether one jurisdiction’s tax rate 
reacts to a change in the tax rate in another jurisdiction. Even though countries are not 
directly affected by each other’s tax regimes, the amount of a resource (generally capital) 
that resides in their country will depend on all countries’ tax rates. If they compete for 
this resource using the tax system, then we can expect to find interdependence in tax 
systems. Apart from this resource-based competition, there are however other processes 
that would equally lead to interdependence. If evidence of interdependence is found, we 
therefore cannot conclude that this must have been driven by tax competition.  
An alternative explanation for interdependence in tax setting behaviour between countries 
is yardstick competition or tax mimicking. In this model voters judge the performance of 
the government by comparing their tax rates to the ones in neighbouring countries. This 
clearly also leads to interdependence in tax setting. 
Yardstick competition is one form of direct spillover. More generally fiscal spillovers can 
occur if tax and spending decisions by a government in one jurisdiction also affect 
residents in a neighbouring jurisdiction. For example, if one country uses taxes to reduce 
pollution this may have positive benefits to residents of neighbouring jurisdictions and 
result in interdependent tax setting. 
                                                 
30 See Brueckner (2003) for an overview of empirical studies.  27
Finally, related movements in tax rules could also be caused by a common factor driving 
tax reforms in all countries, such as common intellectual trends. A specific example 
would be an influential study on the optimal choice of corporate tax rates of which 
economic advisors in many countries become aware. In that case one would see 
simultaneous tax reforms even in the absence of any competitive process. The rate-
lowering base-broadening reforms of the past two decades for example might not have 
been caused by tax competition but instead by a common desire and understanding of the 
importance of simple and fraud robust tax systems. 
Because of this observational equivalence, i.e. that different models imply the same 
predicted behavioural response, it is necessary in empirical work to provide additional 
justification if any particular interpretation is made. For example, Besley and Case (1995) 
show that voters’ support for incumbents is related to the taxes of neighbouring states. 
This lends support to their interpretation of interdependence as indicative of yardstick 
competition. This sort of evidence can often be difficult to provide in practice. However, 
for policy formation it is crucial that we understand which model is driving behaviour.  
(b) Within country direct studies 
A number of papers have looked at competition at the sub-national level. In most cases 
the approach is to look at interdependence across local governments, although some 
papers also study the interdependence between local governments and the central 
government. These studies suggest support for all three forms of tax competition.  
Case, Rosen and Hines (1993) find evidence of interdependence between US States due 
to public expenditure spillovers while Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) find evidence to 
suggest that there are spillovers due to pollution abatement.  
Revelli (2002) finds evidence against the tax-spill-over model, but cannot discriminate 
between the resource-flow and yardstick competition models using English municipal 
data on property taxes. A number of papers are based on the resource flow model, which 
is of most interest to us here. Most of them however do not explicitly test it against the 
yardstick competition model. Empirical papers include the following: Brueckner and 
Saavedra (2001) find strategic interaction for property taxes in cities in the Boston 
metropolitan area; Brett and Pinske (2000) obtain similar results using business property  28
taxes of municipalities in British Columbia (Canada); Buettner (2001) finds 
interdependence for local business tax across German municipalities. Hayashi and 
Boadway (2001) find more evidence of interaction of provincial corporate taxes with the 
central government’s tax than across provinces in Canada; Esteller-Moré and Solé-Olé 
(2002) study Canadian income taxes and find evidence of interdependence across 
Canadian provinces, that this is mitigated by the presence of equalisation grants and they 
find interdependence between provinces and the central government. 
A paper that specifically finds evidence of yardstick competition is Besley and Case 
(1995) using income tax data for US States. 
(c) International  direct  studies. 
More recently empirical work has turned to international tax competition. Chennells and 
Griffith (1997) consider specific predictions from the tax competition literature and look 
at whether the empirical evidence supports them. They calculate effective and implicit 
tax rates for ten countries over the period 1979-1994. They then consider whether small 
countries have lower taxes than larger countries,
31 whether this depends on the degree of 
openness, and whether capital importing countries set their tax rates at, or below, a 
dominant capital exporter.
32 None of these hypotheses are supported by the data.  
Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002) present evidence on the development of taxes on 
the income from capital since the mid 1960s. They find that effective tax rates on 
marginal investments have remained fairly stable as a result of rate-cutting base-
broadening reforms. Effective tax rates on more profitable investments however have 
fallen substantially. As more profitable capital is often also the more mobile capita, this 
can be interpreted as competition for mobile capital, particularly that employed by 
multinationals (see above). They cannot however rule out an alternative explanation, e.g. 
countries trying to discourage the shifting of paper profits, as modelled in Haufler and 
Schjelderup (2002). 
                                                 
31 See, inter alia, Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991).  
32 See, inter alia, Gordon (1992).  29
There are only two papers that the authors are aware of that directly address the question 
of whether there is empirical evidence to suggest that countries engage in tax competition 
for mobile capital. 
Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2001) use an updated version of the data in 
Chennells and Griffith (1997) and estimate countries’ reaction functions. The strength of 
this paper is that the authors pay careful attention to measuring forward-looking effective 
tax rates. The weakness is that, in order to do this, they limit themselves to ten countries 
over a relatively short time period, and can only look at taxes on specific types of 
corporate investment. They find evidence to suggest that there is interdependence in the 
statutory and average tax rates, but not in marginal tax rates. They interpret this as 
evidence in favour of tax competition. The authors are not able to provide any supporting 
evidence to distinguish between the various models (resource flows, yardstick, spill-overs 
or other common factors). 
Besley, Griffith and Klemm (2001) estimate the interdependence in tax setting behaviour 
amongst OECD countries. The strength of this paper is that it considers a larger number 
of countries and five tax bases (labour, corporate, property, sales, excise), which vary in 
the degree of mobility. The drawback is that, in order to look at so many countries and 
such a range of taxes, the authors have to use backward looking average tax rates. The 
paper tests two hypotheses that arise from the tax competition literature: (i) that taxes on 
more mobile factors should be more interdependent, (ii) that interdependence should be 
greater between countries where there is greater mobility (e.g. the EU). They find 
evidence in favour of these hypotheses. While it is still difficult to distinguish between 
the various models, we could interpret the fact that the degree of interdependence on 
different factors is related to their mobility as evidence in favour of the resource flows 
model. 
Finally, a paper by Bretschger and Hettich (2002) should be mentioned. Their paper in a 
way combines the indirect and direct approaches, as it analyses the effect of the openness 
of the economy on an implicit corporate income tax rate. Unlike most previous work, 
they control for the fact that small countries always appear to be more open, when their 
trade is expressed as a share of national income. They find that more open economies  30
have lower tax rates, supporting a tax competition model. Yardstick competition in this 
set up is much less likely. 
Summing up the direct evidence, it seems that the existence of some interdependence in 
tax rates is now a relatively robust finding. The process driving this remains unclear 
though. While some papers produce evidence in favour of or against one of the possible 
mechanisms, at least for a specific tax, we still cannot confidently conclude which 
process is the most relevant in driving corporate income tax interdependence.  
5.  Comments and Summary 
What do we conclude from this discussion?  
There are a number of stylised facts about the evolution of taxes over the past few 
decades: statutory tax rates have fallen; tax bases were broadened, particularly during the 
eighties; effective tax rates, which capture the impact of the tax rate and base on the 
return from an investment, fell for profitable projects, but remained fairly stable for 
projects that just break even or make low profits; tax revenues from corporate income 
have remained broadly stable as a proportion of GDP since 1965; tax revenues from 
corporate income have declined as a proportion of total tax revenue since 1965, but have 
remained relatively stable since 1980. 
There are a number of difficulties in looking for direct empirical evidence on national 
governments’ tax setting behaviour. Several alternative models yield very similar 
empirical predictions, distinguishing between them is difficult. The data needed to do this 
is not readily available. The indirect evidence is not much better. It is very difficult to 
draw direct implications about tax setting behaviour from the literature on the impact of 
tax on firms’ behaviour. 
From a broad reading of the literature one could conclude that the evidence points to 
some form of interdependence between tax setting behaviour across local and national 
governments. However, even this finding can be questioned at the country level due 
mainly to problems with the data used. Distinguishing between different reasons for this 
interdependence is simply not possible from the current state of the literature.  31
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